Lynch v. Donnelly: Breaking Down the Barriers to Religious Displays by Gordon, Glenn S.
Cornell Law Review
Volume 71
Issue 1 November 1985 Article 6
Lynch v. Donnelly: Breaking Down the Barriers to
Religious Displays
Glenn S. Gordon
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Glenn S. Gordon, Lynch v. Donnelly: Breaking Down the Barriers to Religious Displays , 71 Cornell L. Rev. 185 (1985)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol71/iss1/6
NOTES
LYNCH V DONNELLY: BREAKING DOWN THE
BARRIERS TO RELIGIOUS DISPLAYS
INTRODUCTION
In Lynch v. Donnelly' the Supreme Court held that the City of
Pawtucket, Rhode Island, did not violate the constitutional prohibi-
tion against "a law respecting an establishment of religion" 2 by in-
cluding a cr&he in its annual Christmas display. The Court, facing
its first challenge to a governmental display of a religious symbol,
used sweeping language that will also validate the displays of reli-
gious symbols in other settings. 3
The Supreme Court has traditionally applied the tripartite
Lemon 4 test to cases arising under the establishment clause. The
Lemon test reflects a separationist 5 interpretation of the establish-
ment clause because it forbids governmental aid to religion even if
all religions benefit equally. The Lynch majority applied the Lemon
test in this case, but it did so in a cursory and strained manner.6
Contrary to the spirit of the Lemon test, the majority reached a deci-
sion favoring acknowledgement and accommodation of religion.
This Note traces the Supreme Court's methods of analyzing es-
tablishment clause cases and argues that Lynch manifests the desire
of some members of the Court to adopt an accommodationist stance
toward constitutional questions regarding religion. 7  Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion8 particularly evinces an accom-
modationist view because her proposed modification of the Lemon
test allows state action that effectively advances religion.9 This Note
concludes that the Lynch majority's arguments in favor of the
1 Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1. The first amendment's establishment clause declares
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." Id. The
Supreme Court held in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947), that the four-
teenth amendment applies the establishment clause to the states.
3 See infra notes 130-66 and accompanying text.
4 The Lemon test originated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The test
is discussed infra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
5 See infra note 15 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 116-29 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 167-83 and accompanying text.
8 Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1366-70 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
9 See infra notes 173-77 and accompanying text.
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crche's constitutionality are unpersuasive' ° and that the decision
justifies other governmental displays of religious symbols."1
I
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
A. A Search for Standards: Pre-Lemon Decisions
The Supreme Court gave its first exposition of the establish-
ment clause in its 1947 Everson v. Board of Education12 decision. Jus-
tice Black, writing for the Everson majority, concluded that "[t]he
'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all reli-
gions, or prefer one religion over another."' 13
Since Everson, commentators have debated the accuracy of
Black's interpretation of the establishment clause. Jurists have ad-
vanced several theories of establishment clause interpretation, two
of which, the "strict separation" theory and the "accommodation"
theory, have competed for Supreme Court approval. 14 Separation-
10 See infra notes 111-29 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 130-66 and accompanying text.
12 330 U.S. 1 (1947). The Everson Court held that a school district did not violate
the establishment clause by reimbursing parents for the costs of sending their children
to private school by public transportation. Id. at 17. Although the resolution challenged
in Everson effectively reimbursed parents only if their child attended a Catholic parochial
school, id. at 20-21 (Jackson, J., dissenting), the Court ruled that the benefit flowed to
the children rather than to the Church. Id. at 17-18. The plaintiff thus failed to convince
the court that the state had indirectly subsidized religion. Id. at 18.
Although modern establishment clause theory began with Everson, see R. MORGAN,
THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION 76 (1972) ("[T]he initial exposition of the establish-
ment clause by the Supreme Court came in 1947 .. "), the Supreme Court had de-
cided one earlier case on establishment clause grounds. In Bradfield v. Roberts, 175
U.S. 291 (1899), the plaintiff sued to enjoin the City of Washington, D.C., from spend-
ing federal money to help support an allegedly sectarian hospital. Id. at 295. The Court
found that the hospital was merely "a secular corporation being managed by people who
hold to the doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church" and affirmed the lower court's
dismissal for "fail[ure] to set forth a cause of action." Id. at 298-300. The short opinion
did not attempt to define the establishment clause's prohibitions on governmental
actions.
13 330 U.S. at 15.
14 See infra notes 15-16 and accompanying text. A third theory, proposed by Profes-
sor Philip Kurland, advocates an approach similar to the suspect classification scheme
the Supreme Court has taken in equal protection cases. Professor Kurland suggests that
the free exercise clause and the establishment clause should together "mean that reli-
gion may not be used as a basis for classification for purposes of governmental action,
whether that action be the conferring of rights or privileges or the imposition of duties
or obligations." P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAw 17-18 (1962). Thus far, the
Supreme Court has not accepted Professor Kurland's theory.
Some commentators disagree with the Everson Court's conclusion that the four-
teenth amendment applies the establishment clause to the states. See R. BERGER, Gov-
ERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 134-56 (1977) (maintaining that drafters of fourteenth
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ists argue that the establishment clause requires an impenetrable
boundary between religion and government. According to the sepa-
rationist theory, the establishment clause prohibits both govern-
mental preference for religion over non-religion and governmental
preference between religions. 15 Accommodationists, on the other
hand, argue that the framers of the establishment clause meant only
to prevent the government from favoring one sect over another and
did not intend to forbid neutral government support for religion as
a whole. 16
Shortly after Everson, in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educa-
tion,17 the Supreme Court used the establishment clause for the first
time to strike down a governmental practice. The mother of an Illi-
nois schoolchild sued to enjoin the state's "shared time" program
which allowed religious teaching in public schools.' 8 The Court
held that the state's use of the public school system for religious
training constituted impermissible aid to religion and disagreed
with the Board of Education's argument that the first amendment
allows "an impartial governmental assistance [to] all religions."' 19
Despite the Supreme Court's adoption of the separationist the-
ory in Everson and McCollum, subsequent Supreme Court opinions
amendment did not intend that it embrace all other constitutional amendments and
make them applicable to states); Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill
of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949)(same). The Supreme Court has referred to this
argument as "entirely untenable and of value only as an academic exercis[e]." School
Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 217 (1963).
15 See, e.g., Pfeffer, Freedom and/or Separation: The Constitutional Dilemma of the First
Amendment, 64 MINN. L. REV. 561, 566 (1980) ("The barrier against laws setting up a
church, preferring one religion over another, or aiding religion is generally considered
to be an aspect of the antiestablishment provision .. "); Note, Rebuilding the Wall: The
Case for a Return to the Strict Interpretation of the Establishment Clause, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1463
(1981) (advocating prohibiting any aid flowing from state to religious organizations
either directly or indirectly except when such aid is contained in general welfare grant
benefitting whole of society).
16 See, e.g., R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 214 (1982) ("[F]ederal or
state governmental actions most likely to violate an historically correct understanding of
the Establishment of Religion Clause are only those public acts that in some way elevate
a single religion, religious sect, or religious tradition into a legally preferred sta-
tus .. "); Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School Board, 14 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 3 (1949) (asserting that legislative history of establishment clause demonstrates
that its framers only intended to prohibit favoring one religion over another).
17 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
18 In a "shared time" program teachers excuse students early from their public
school class to attend religious instruction. The program originated in Gary, Indiana, in
1914 when school children were released early to attend religious classes at a church of
their own faith. Other school systems modified the program and allowed religious
groups to send teachers into public schools to hold religious instruction classes. L.
PFEFFER, GOD, CAESAR, AND THE CONsTnTION 181-82 (1975). The Illinois program
challenged in McCollum was of the latter type. See McCollum, 333 U.S. at 207-09 (detail-
ing operation of Illinois program).
19 333 U.S. at 211.
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contain language indicating some support for the accommodationist
view.20 In Zorach v. Clauson,2 1 for example, the Court upheld New
York City's "shared time" program, even though it differed only
marginally from the Illinois program that McCollum invalidated. 22
Justice Douglas, writing for the Zorach majority, emphasized that in
some situations the government could accommodate religion and
stated only that "[tlhe government must be neutral when it comes to
competition between sects." 23 In a sentence often cited by accom-
modationist parties and courts, 24 Douglas wrote that "[w]e are a
religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Be-
ing." 25  Thus, in contrast with Everson and McCollum, Zorach
presented an accommodationist interpretation of the establishment
clause.
The Zorach decision did not end debate about how the Court
should properly interpret the establishment clause. The Supreme
Court continued its philosophical see-sawing when the separationist
view reemerged in the early 1960s. In the "school prayer cases,"
Engel v. Vitale 26 and School District of Abington Township v. Schempp,27
the court invalidated the longstanding28 and widespread 29 practice
20 See e.g., cases cited infra note 168. One commentator complained that "[t]he es-
tablishment clause opinions handed down by the Court in the last twenty-five years have
been replete with contradictory assertions [and] confusing signals." Note, supra note 15,
at 1473.
21 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
22 Id. at 315. New York City's program allowed participating students to leave
school early to attend religious instruction at their place of worship. Id. at 308. The city
required that participating religious institutions give a weekly list of attendance to the
child's public school principal or teacher. Id. & n. 1. Three Justices, including Justice
Black (author of McCollum decision), dissented. The dissenting Justices believed that
New York City's program differed only marginally from Illinois's and considered the
Zorach and McCollum holdings inconsistent. Id. at 316 (Black, J., dissenting), 322-23
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting), 325 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
23 Id. at 314 (emphasis added).
24 See, e.g., Hall v. Bradshaw, 630 F.2d 1018, 1022-23 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 965 (1981) (although holding that inclusion of "motorist's prayer" on map
published by state agency violated establishment clause, court noted that references to
deity in ceremonies and on coinage reflected history of nation identified with religion);
Allen v. Hickel, 424 F.2d 944, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (in challenge to government display
of creche, court, citing Zorach's language, stated that first amendment does not require
government to ignore existence of certain widely-held customs and beliefs).
25 343 U.S. at 313. Professor Kurland called this statement "famed, troublemaking,
and essentially meaningless." Kurland, The Regents' Prayer Case: "Full of Sound and Fury,
Signifying... ," in CHURCH AND STATE: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT 16 (P. Kurland ed. 1975).
26 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (invalidating New York's practice of having public school
children voluntarily recite nondenominational state-composed prayer).
27 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (invalidating Pennsylvania law requiring that verses from
Bible be read aloud at beginning of each public school day).
28 "The use of prayers and Bible readings at the opening of the school day long
antedates the founding of our Republic." Id. at 267 (Brennan, J., concurring).
29 Twenty-two states entered the Engel case as amici curiae on behalf of New York.
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of beginning the public school day with a religious ceremony. In
Schempp Justice Clark provided a new test for establishment clause
cases: "to withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause
there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion."3 0 Despite the government's
contention that the challenged school exercises implemented the
secular purpose of promoting moral values3 1 and recognizing the
nation's spiritual heritage,32 the Court found an impermissible state
goal of inculcating children with religion and a consequent effect of
advancing religion.33
The Supreme Court relied on yet another method of establish-
ment clause analysis to uphold the religious property tax exemp-
tions challenged in Walz v. Tax Commission.34 In Walz the Court
declared that the establishment clause forbids actions creating "an
excessive government entanglement with religion."3 5 The Walz
Court saw excessive entanglement as a threat to the twin aims of the
establishment clause: prohibiting secular government from control-
ling religion and preventing religious groups from attempting to
use government for their own benefit.3 6 The Court admitted that
entanglement "is inescapably [a test] of degree" but ruled that any-
thing more than minimal contacts between religion and government
would contravene the establishment clause.3 7 The Walz Court also
saw the lack of a union of religion and government throughout the
long history of tax exemption for religious property as evidence that
the government's program would not lead to the "established
church or religion" that the first amendment prohibits.38
Justice Harlan, concurring in Walz, indicated that governmental
entanglement with religion could also cause political divisiveness.3 9
Harlan feared that the administration and planning likely to accom-
pany programs involving both government and religion would polit-
icize religion as different sects competed for limited federal and
Engel, 370 U.S. at 421-22. Nineteen states favoring school prayer filed amicus curiae
briefs in Schenpp. Schenpp, 374 U.S. at 204.
30 374 U.S. at 222.
31 See id. at 223 (arguing that exercises combated "materialistic trends" of age, per-
petuated secular institutions, and presented valuable literary work).
32 Engel, 370 U.S. at 425; Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223.
33 Engel, 370 U.S. at 425; Schempp, 374 U.S. at 224.
34 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding governmental grants of tax exemption for prop-
erty used for religious purposes).
35 Id. at 674.
36 See id. at 675 (holding, however, that grant of tax exemption does not constitute
excessive entanglement because tax exemption does not subsidize church, but simply
refrains from demanding that church support state).
37 Id. at 674.
38 Id. at 678.
39 Id. at 695-96 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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state resources. 40 Justice Harlan suggested that courts consider the
threat of political discord when deciding establishment clause
cases.
4 1
B. The Lemon Test
One year after Walz, in Lemon v. Kurtzman,42 the Supreme Court
synthesized its previous opinions and formulated a tripartite test for
deciding whether the establishment clause prohibited a challenged
governmental act. The Court ruled that to pass constitutional
muster:
[f]irst, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second,
its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster "an exces-
sive government entanglement with religion." 43
The Lemon majority, in dictum, also wrote favorably of Justice
Harlan's "political divisiveness" theory.44 The Court did not incor-
porate a "political divisiveness" prong into its test but wrote that
"political division along religious lines was one of the principal evils
against which the First Amendment was intended to protect."' 45
C. Post-Lemon Establishment Clause Theory
Since the Lemon decision, the Supreme Court has applied the
Lemon test in all but two establishment clause cases. Both of these
cases presented new lines of reasoning for interpreting the estab-
lishment clause. In the first case, Larson v. Valente,46 the plaintiffs
alleged that Minnesota's statute regulating charitable solicitations
discriminated among religious sects.47 The Larson majority explic-
40 Id.
41 Although the Supreme Court has never adopted the political divisiveness theory
as a test of constitutionality, cases decided after Walz have dealt with the concept. See,
e.g., Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 127 (1982) ("The challenged statute
thus enmeshes churches in the processes of government and creates the danger of
'[p]olitical fragmentation and divisiveness on religious lines.'" (citing Lemon v. Kurtz-
man, 403 U.S. 602, 623 (1971))); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1979) (plurality)
("The Act thus provides successive opportunities for political fragmentation and divi-
sion along religious lines.").
42 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (declaring unconstitutional Pennsylvania statute that pro-
vided funds to help private schools defray cost of teaching secular subjects).
43 403 U.S. at 612-13 (citation omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664, 674 (1980)).
44 Id. at 622-25. The Court indicated that the statutory programs at issue could
potentially cause political divisiveness by requiring annual appropriations and consum-
ing state fiscal resources. Id. at 623.
45 Id. at 622.
46 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
47 Id. at 230. Minnesota's statute "provide[d] for a system of registration and dis-
closure respecting charitable organizations, and [was] designed to protect the contribut-
[Vol. 71:185
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itly refused to decide the case using the Lemon test, reasoning that
"the [Lemon] 'tests' are intended to apply to laws affording a uniform
benefit to all religions, and not to provisions. . . that discriminate
among religions." 48 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, as-
serted that the Court's precedent demanded that they treat "a state
law granting a denominational preference" with "strict scrutiny." 49
Before Larson, however, the Court had neither invalidated a statute
on the ground that it discriminated among religions nor applied a
"strict scrutiny" analysis in establishment clause cases.5 0 The dis-
crimination in favor of popularly accepted religions evident in Min-
nesota's statute, however, apparently convinced the Court that they
should use an equal protection standard. The Court thus required
that Minnesota demonstrate that the law served a compelling state
interest and closely fitted this interest.51 The Court accepted argu-
endo Minnesota's claim that the state had a compelling interest in
protecting the public from fraudulent practices, but ruled that the
statute's means were not sufficiently tailored to serve this goal.52
The majority did not expressly limit future applications of the strict
scrutiny test to facially discriminatory action, but stressed its finding
that Minnesota's law discriminated on its face. 53 Thus far, Larson is
ing public and charitable beneficiaries against fraudulent practices." Id. at 230-31. Prior
to 1978, the legislature had exempted all religious groups from the statute's require-
ments. Id. at 231. In 1978 Minnesota's legislature amended the statute to require that
groups receiving less than half of their total contributions from members of related or-
ganizations meet the extensive registration and reporting procedures the law required,
thus disfavoring groups that solicited from the general public. MINN. STAT. § 309.515(b)
(Supp. 1982). Larson, 456 U.S. at 231-32. Members of the Unification Church sued to
prevent the state from enforcing the new law. Id. at 232-34.
48 456 U.S. at 252 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). In dictum, the Larson
Court maintained that Minnesota's statute would also fail the Lemon test because it in-
volved "an excessive governmental entanglement with religion." The majority asserted
that the statute's legislative history revealed an intent to discriminate among sects, thus
encouraging political divisiveness. Id at 251-55. For a discussion of the Court's possi-
ble motives for not applying the Lemon test in Larson, see Note, Another Brick in the Walk
Denominational Preferences and Strict Scrutiny Under the Establishment Clause, Larson v. Va-
lente, 62 NEB. L. REv. 359 (1983).
49 456 U.S. at 246.
50 See Note, supra note 48, at 361 (Larson stands as Court's first use of strict scrutiny
analysis in establishment clause cases). The Larson Court cited Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97 (1968), School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963), Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), and Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1 (1947), for the premise that the establishment clause required "denominational
neutrality," 456 U.S. at 246, but in none of these cases did the Court apply a strict
scrutiny analysis.
51 456 U.S. at 246-47.
52 Id. at 248-51.
53 The Larson Court distinguished the statute in that case from laws with an inciden-
tal disparate impact among religions on the ground that the statute involved in Larson
was not facially neutral. Id. at 246-47 n.23.
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the only case in which the Court has invalidated a statute on the
ground that it discriminated among religions.
The second case, Marsh v. Chambers,54 digressed more signifi-
cantly from the Lemon test. The Marsh Court upheld Nebraska's
practice of hiring a chaplain to recite a prayer at the opening of each
legislative session.55 The Court pointed to the long history of legis-
lative chaplains and explained that even the drafters of the first
amendment approved hiring a chaplain for the House and Senate. 56
The majority neither applied the Lemon test nor explained why the
three-pronged analysis was inapposite. The dissent interpreted the
majority's disregard for Lemon to mean that Marsh was a narrow
opinion approving legislative chaplains rather than a change in
traditional doctrine. 57
Despite these two recent cases, the Lemon test, with its separa-
tionist tenor, has served as the cornerstone of establishment clause
analysis. Even in the Larson and Marsh decisions, where the
Supreme Court applied a different analysis, the majority did not re-
ject the Lemon test. 58 The Court returned to the Lemon test in Lynch
v. Donnelly 59 but applied it there in a cursory manner that avoided
Lemon's separationist effect.60
III
LYNCH V. DONNELLY
Every November the City of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, erected a
Christmas display in a private park in the downtown commercial
area.61 The city placed a creche in the foreground of the display,
consisting of life-sized representations of the figures present in the
traditional story of Christ's birth. 62 The display also included sev-
eral secular items commonly associated with celebrations of the
Christmas holiday season. 63 The plaintiffs, members of the Ameri-
54 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
55 Id. at 786
56 Id. at 786-92.
57 Id. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
58 See supra notes 46-57 and accompanying text.
59 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984); see infra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
60 See infra notes 116-29 and accompanying text.
61 Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1154 (D.R.I. 1981).
62 Id. at 1156. Pawtucket had included a creche in its Christmas display for at least
40 years. Id. at 1158. The city purchased their present creche in 1973 for $1,365 and
spent only a minimal amount of money for its upkeep. Id. at 1156. The trial court found
that the figures' "poses, coupled with their facial expressions, connote[d] an atmosphere
of devotion, worship, and awe." Id.
63 These items included "a 'talking' wishing well," a "Santa's House, inhabited by a
live Santa who distributed candy," "four large, five-pointed stars covered with small
white electric lights," "a spray of reindeer pulling Santa's sleigh," "cutout letters,
colored in fluorescent paint, that spell[ed] 'SEASON'S GREETINGS,'" and various
[Vol. 71:185
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can Civil Liberties Union, sued to enjoin the city from including the
creche in the display after the city refused to remove the cr&che vol-
untarily.64 The plaintiffs alleged that the cr6che's presence in the
display demonstrated official support for Christianity and thus vio-
lated the establishment clause.65
A. The Lower Federal Courts Bar the Cr&he
The district court found that the creche constituted an inher-
ently religious symbol and that the surrounding secular elements
failed to neutralize its religious nature.6 6 The court then applied
the tripartite Lemon test to the challenged activity. Despite the city's
contention that the court should apply the secular purpose prong to
the display as a whole, the court scrutinized the creche alone.67 The
court concluded that the city's claim "that the presence of the
creche in the display merely acknowledges the religious heritage of
the holiday" indicated a sectarian goal. Pawtucket therefore failed to
meet the Lemon test's secular purpose requirement. 68 The court
also held that the creche impermissibly advanced religion because
the city had "singled out [Christian] religious beliefs as worthy of
particular attention, thereby implying that these beliefs are true or
especially desirable." 69 Although the court concluded that the
creche did not create the daily administrative entanglement between
religion and government that the establishment clause prohibits, 70
the court did find the creche politically divisive. The trial judge con-
cluded that this political divisiveness constituted yet another ground
for invalidating the cr&che under the establishment clause.71 The
district court thus declared Pawtucket's display of the crche uncon-
other figures including carolers, "a clown, a dancing elephant, a robot, and a teddy
bear." Id. at 1155.
64 Id. at 1153, 1158 n.14.
65 Id. at 1156-57.
66 Id. at 1165-68. The court compared the creche to some of the other elements of
the display and found that the major, and possibly only, significance of the creche was
the story that it symbolically told: "In sum, the Court does not understand what mean-
ing the creche, as a symbol, can have other than a religious meaning." Id. at 1167.
67 Id. at 1168-70. Although the court acknowledged the importance of context, it
feared that allowing the inclusion of a secular item to protect a religious item from indi-
vidual scrutiny would permit easy avoidance of establishment clause prohibitions. Id. at
1169.
68 Id. at 1170. The court expressed concern that the city's explanation could turn
any belief or action common to the majority into "a matter of culture or tradition and
thereby imply that they have somehow attained a neutral, objective status." Id.
69 Id. at 1178.
70 Id. at 1179.
71 Id. at 1178-80. The court noted that since the suit began, "the atmosphere has
been a horrifying one of anger, hostility, name calling, and political maneuvering, all
prompted by the fact that someone had questioned the City's ownership and display of a
religious symbol." Id. at 1180.
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stitutional and enjoined the city from including a nativity scene in
future exhibits.
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district
court's holding72 but applied the Larson73 strict scrutiny standard. 74
The court found the strict scrutiny analysis applicable because "the
City's ownership and use of the nativity scene is an act which dis-
criminates between Christian and non-Christian religions." 75 The
court ruled that Pawtucket lacked the compelling interest Larson re-
quired,76 reasoning that the city's failure to convince the trial court
that it had a secular purpose for including the crbche precluded any
possibility that the city had a compelling objective. 77 Because Paw-
tucket's action failed to satisfy the strict scrutiny test's first require-
ment, the court did not inquire into whether the governmental
action was "closely fitted to further the interest that it assertedly
serves."
78
B. The Supreme Court Reverses
1. Majority
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals in a five to
four decision, holding that the creche did not violate the establish-
ment clause. 79 The majority's opinion adopted an accommodation-
ist tone as five Justices distanced themselves from earlier decisions
interpreting the establishment clause as requiring "a 'wall' between
church and state."80 The Court instead wrote that the Constitution
does not "require complete separation of church and state; it affirm-
atively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all reli-
gions, and forbids hostility toward any." '81
In a brief footnote the Court rejected the First Circuit's applica-
72 Donnelly v. Lynch, 691 F.2d 1029, 1035 (1st Cir. 1982).
73 Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982); see supra notes 46-53 and accompanying
text.
74 The Larson decision came down after the district court decided Donnelly v.
Lynch. Donnelly, 691 F.2d at 1034.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 1035.
77 Id. The court explained that "[i]f one is unable to demonstrate any legitimate
purpose or interest, it is hardly necessary to inquire whether a compelling purpose or
interest can be shown." Id. (emphasis in original). The court questioned the district
court's implication that political divisiveness alone could be a ground for holding the
cr&he display unconstitutional. Id.
78 Larson, 456 U.S. at 248.
79 Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984). The federal government filed an
amicus curiae brief supporting Pawtucket's appeal. Id. at 1357.
80 Id. at 1359.
81 Id.
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tion of the Larson8 2 strict scrutiny standard: "we are unable to see
this display, or any part of it, as explicitly discriminatory in the sense
contemplated in Larson." 3 The majority thus limited the Larson
holding to facially discriminatory statutes or actions.8 4 The Court
also distinguished the historical approach of Marsh v. Chambers85 be-
cause Pawtucket could not demonstrate that either public celebra-
tions of Christmas or official displays of nativity scenes existed at the
time of the First Congress.8 6 The Lemon test therefore remained the
only existing method of establishment clause analysis available to
the majority, and they applied it to Pawtucket's action.
Unlike the two lower courts, the Supreme Court viewed the
cr&che in light of the entire Christmas season,8 7 rather than focusing
on the nativity scene alone. The Court did not explain its choice of
context except to caution that "[f]ocus[ing] exclusively on the reli-
gious component of any activity would inevitably lead to its invalida-
tion under the Establishment Clause."88 Characterizing the city's
action as "principally tak[ing] note of a significant historical reli-
gious event long celebrated in the Western World,"8' 9 the majority
held that the city's desire to acknowledge the origins of Christmas
satisfied the Lemon test's secular purpose requirement.9 0 Further-
more, the Court ruled that Pawtucket's inclusion of the creche in the
display neither advanced nor inhibited religion, reasoning that any
benefit to religion was "indirect, remote, and incidental." 9' 1 Finally,
the Court concluded that the cr&he did not cause any administra-
tive entanglement.9 2 The majority questioned the district court's
82 Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982). See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying
text.
83 104 S. Ct. at 1366 n.13.
84 Larson, 456 U.S. at 246 n.23. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
85 463 U.S. 783 (1983). See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
86 104 S. Ct. at 1383-86 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Court's interest in the his-
tory of official celebrations of Christmas is evident from questions the Court asked dur-
ing oral argument. Id. at 1383 n.25.
87 Id. at 1362.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 1363.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 1364. The Court explained that the creche benefited religion no more than
did other activities held not violative of the first amendment. Id. at 1363-64. The Court
cited Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (legislative prayer by chaplains paid with
public funds); Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (plurality) (gen-
eral grants to church sponsored schools); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971)
(plurality) (public expenditures for building church sponsored schools); Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (property tax exemptions); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392
U.S. 236 (1968); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (upholding Sunday dosing
laws); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (release time program for religious train-
ing); and Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (public expenditures for trans-
porting children to religious schools).
92 104 S. Ct. at 1364.
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conclusion that the creche generated political divisiveness9 3 and
noted that the Court has not held "that political divisiveness alone
can serve to invalidate otherwise permissible conduct."9 4 The
Court also stated that courts should not even inquire into political
divisiveness unless the case involves governmental financial pay-
ments to religious schools or groups.9 5
2. O'Connor's Concurrence: Modifying Lemon
Justice O'Connor joined the majority opinion but also filed a
separate concurrence in which she proposed modifying the Lemon
test. According to O'Connor, the Court should not strike down an
activity unless a plaintiff can prove governmental "endorsement or
disapproval of religion" or "excessive entanglement with religious
institutions. ' 9 6 Under O'Connor's theory, the Lemon test's secular
purpose and primary effect prong should probe the subjective and
objective meanings of the challenged government actions.9 7
O'Connor would permit an action when the government neither in-
tends nor appears to endorse or disapprove religion.9 8 Like the ma-
jority, O'Connor examined Pawtucket's creche in light of the
Christmas season. She found that the context "negate[d] any
message of endorsement" of religion, even though its context did
not neutralize the nativity scene's religious significance.99
93 Id. at 1365.
94 Id. at 1364.
95 Id. at 1364-65. This pronouncement reaffirmed previous dicta in Mueller v. Al-
len, 463 U.S. 388 (1983). The Mueller Court limited political divisiveness inquiries "to
cases where direct financial subsidies are paid to parochial schools or to teachers in
parochial schools." Id. at 404 n. 11. The Lynch Court used slightly more expansive lan-
guage to include cases "involv[ing] a direct subsidy to church-sponsored schools or col-
leges, or other religious institutions." Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1364-65. For a discussion and
criticism of the political divisiveness theory, see Gaffney, Political Divisiveness Along Reli-
gious Lines: The Entanglement of the Court in Sloppy History and Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 205 (1980) (political divisiveness test rests on inaccurate historical base and
threatens civil liberties).
96 104 S. Ct. at 1366 (O'Connor, J., concurring). O'Connor elaborated that "the
effect of communicating a message of government endorsement or disapproval of reli-
gion," not the advancement or inhibition of religions, is crucial. Id. at 1368. Despite the
facial similarity between O'Connor's standard and the Lemon test, O'Connor's analysis
would have an accommodationist effect on establishment clause decisions. See infra
notes 173-77 and accompanying text. O'Connor subsequently came to question the va-
lidity of inquiring into institutional entanglement. See Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232,
3247 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("My reservations about the entanglement test
• . . have come to encompass its institutional aspects as well.").
97 104 S. Ct. at 1367. The subjective meaning is the government's intended pur-
pose while the objective meaning is the community's perception of the government's
intent. Id. at 1367-68.
98 Id. at 1368.
99 Id. at 1369. O'Connor compared the crche to the legislative prayer upheld in
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), see supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text,
and found it to be no greater a religious endorsement. Id.
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3. Dissent
Four Justices dissented in an opinion written by Justice Bren-
nan.100 The majority's broad language approving governmental ac-
commodation and acknowledgment of religion, and the majority's
ambivalence toward the Lemon test, disturbed the dissenters.'10 The
dissent expressed particular concern that "the Court's less than rig-
orous application of the Lemon test"'1 2 manifested the majority's de-
sire to weaken Lemon's separationist effect.' 03 Unlike the majority,
the dissenters believed that "the clear religious effect of the
creche"' 10 4 offended the establishment clause notwithstanding the
surrounding secular items.105
The dissenters, like the majority, applied the Lemon test to Paw-
tucket's inclusion of the nativity scene in its Christmas display.' 0 6
They found that the creche's "distinctively religious"' 1 7 nature, as
well as Pawtucket's ability to achieve its stated secular goals without
using the creche, demonstrated a sectarian purpose.' 0 8 The dissent-
ers also thought the creche unconstitutional because it had the "pri-
mary effect" of "plac[ing] the government's imprimatur of approval
on the particular religious beliefs exemplified by the cr&he."' 10 9
The dissenters agreed with the majority that evidence of political
divisiveness was an insufficient reason for declaring an activity un-
constitutional and that no administrative entanglement existed in
100 104 S. Ct. at 1370 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens joined Brennan's dissent.
101 Id. at 1370-71, 1380-82. Brennan wrote of three types of permissible govern-
ment acknowledgment of religion: (1) accommodating individuals' right to practice their
religion, (2) the continuance of a practice that has lost its religious significance over
time, and (3) minor recognitions of religion such as "the reference to God contained in
the Pledge of Allegiance" that "have lost through rote repetition any significant reli-
gious content." The crtche, according to Brennan, fit none of these categories. Id. at
1380-82. Justice Powell, who joined the Lynch majority, later had second thoughts about
that opinion's ambivalence toward the Lemon test. In Wallace v.Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479
(1985), Powell wrote "separately to ... respond to criticism of the three-pronged Lemon
test." Id. at 2493 (Powell, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). Powell noted that the tri-
partite test had aided the Court in deciding establishment clause cases and feared that
"continued criticism of it could encourage other courts to feel free to decide Establish-
ment Clause cases on an ad hoc basis." Id. at 2494 (footnote omitted). Powell also stated
in Wallace that Lynch was decided "primarily on the long historical practice of including
religious symbols in the celebration of Christmas." Id. at n.5. The Lynch opinion itself,
however, belies this assertion. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
102 104 S. Ct. at 1370.
103 See id. at 1370-71.
104 Id. at 1376.
105 Id. at 1375-77.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 1373.
108 Id. at 1372-73.
109 Id. at 1373.
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this case.110
III
ANALYSIS
The Lynch opinion is a flawed but important decision in estab-
lishment clause analysis. The Lynch majority wrongly concluded
that Pawtucket's creche did not violate the establishment clause.
The Court did not refute the trial judge's findings of fact and incor-
rectly compared the creche to religiously neutral items. The opin-
ion uses reasoning that approves less secularized displays of nativity
scenes and other religious symbols during the Christmas season.
The Lynch decision and language also reflect an accommodationist
trend within the Supreme Court and indicate the misgivings several
justices have about the Lemon test's separationist effect.
A. The Majority's Flawed Factual Analysis
The Lynch Court's treatment of the facts does not withstand
close analysis. First, the Court imprudently reversed the trial
court's conclusions of fact without inquiring whether they were
"clearly erroneous.""'1 Although the trial judge focused his atten-
tion on Pawtucket's creche by itself,112 he also found that the creche
advanced religion even when viewed within the context of the city's
entire Christmas display. 1' 3 The Supreme Court did not dispute the
district court's finding1 14 but instead cited other government actions
the Court had previously upheld, stating that "[w]e are unable to
discern a greater aid to religion deriving from inclusion of the
creche than from these benefits and endorsements."1 15 The major-
ity's constitutional analysis is thus suspect because it rests on unsup-
ported factual assumptions.
The Court's conclusions about the character of the creche also
110 Id. at 1374-75. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Stevens, also filed a dissent-
ing opinion. Justice Blackmun criticized the majority's failure to follow precedent and
its destruction of the cr~che's religious meaning. Id. at 1386-87 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
111 Justice Brennan criticized the majority for "mak[ing] only a half-hearted attempt
to grapple with the fact that [the trial judge's] detailed findings may not be overturned
unless they are shown to be 'clearly erroneous.'" Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1375 n. 11 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
112 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
113 Donnelly, 525 F. Supp. at 1177.
114 Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1363.
115 Id at 1364. The majority cited eight previous cases in which the government had
prevailed against a claim that its action violated the establishment clause. See supra note
91 and accompanying text. The Court did not compare the creche display with the is-
sues those cases presented; it simply stated that the creche presented no greater threat
of religious establishment than did those earlier cases. See id. at 1363-64.
[Vol. 71:185
RELIGIOUS DISPLAYS
misinterpreted the display's effects. The Lynch majority viewed the
creche as merely a passive display "like a painting" 116 and con-
cluded that disallowing the creche would be tantamount to prohibit-
ing public art galleries from displaying religious paintings.1 17 The
Court's analogy is incorrect, however, because the m~lange of
themes present in a gallery's display reduces the likelihood that a
viewer will perceive that the government supports any one particu-
lar ideology. Furthermore, the atmosphere of a museum lends itself
to a dispassionate study of a painting's merits. In contrast, Paw-
tucket did not claim that the cr&che deserved public display because
it evinced any particular artistic value. The Court's argument would
have been more persuasive had the city placed notices disclaiming
official support for the crche's underlying religious basis around
the nativity scene. Although disclaimers cannot legitimize an im-
proper state motive, Pawtucket could have used them to negate an
observer's interpretation "that a particular faith had been singled
out for public favor and recognition"' 18 and have prevented thereby
the crche's presence from significantly advancing a religion."19
The majority's comparision of the cr&he to an objective study
of the Bible or religion in public schools, 120 a practice that School
District of Abington Township v. Schemppl 2 ' implicitly accepted, is un-
persuasive because it overlooks the effect of Pawtucket's action.
The Schempp Court suggested that studying the Bible does not un-
constitutionally advance religion if the state uses the book in a con-
text that precludes any perception that the government promotes its
religious values. 122 The Schempp Court's finding that beginning the
class day with a reading from the Bible advanced religion even
within the secular public school system,' 23 however, indicated that
placing a religious item within a secular context does not necessarily
prevent the sectarian aspect from unconstitutionally advancing reli-
gion. As with the Bible reading prohibited in Schempp, Pawtucket's
creche retains its individual effect of advancing piety even when
116 Id. at 1365.
117 Id. at 1361.
118 Id. at 1380 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
119 In Allen v. Morton, 495 F.2d 65 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit ruled that a creche could be included in a Christmas display on federal property if
the government disassociated itself from the religious committees overseeing the dis-
play. Id. at 74-76. The court also ruled that "appropriate plaques" would neutralize the
unconstitutional advancement of religion the creche otherwise provided. Id. at 67.
120 Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1362.
121 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963); see supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
122 "Nothing we have said here indicates that such [literary and historical] study of
the Bible or of religion, when presented objectively as part of a secular program of
education, may not be effected consistently with the First Amendment." Schempp, 374
U.S. at 225.
123 See id.
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placed within a secular milieu. The cr&he display does not invite
the debate or discussion of the nativity scene's historical accuracy
and meaning that one would expect in an objective setting, nor did
Pawtucket desire such objectivity. 124
The majority's belief that the cr~che's presence confers no
greater benefit on religion than does "Congressional and Executive
recognition of the origins of the Holiday itself as 'Christ's Mass' 125
is also fallacious. The Court's argument ignores the difference be-
tween recognition of a historical fact and governmental counte-
nance of the religious origins of that fact. Although Christmas
originated as a religious holiday, it has since become associated with
many nonreligious symbols and traditions. Christmas is thus
analagous to the Sunday closing laws the Court approved in Mc-
Gowan v. Maryland.126 The McGowan Court upheld mandatory Sun-
day closing laws against a claim that enforced rest on the Christian
Sabbath violated the establishment clause, finding that although the
laws originally had a religious motive, states continued to enforce
them with the secular goal of providing a respite from work and an
opportunity for family gatherings. 27
Whatever reason Congress had for declaring Christmas a fed-
eral holiday,' 28 the McGowan reasoning allows official Christmas
celebrations if these celebrations remain confined to the holiday's
secular aspects. The cr&he's presence, however, oversteps this nar-
row line because with it the government affirmatively encourages
the religious side of Christmas's dual nature. By erecting a religious
symbol reminding viewers of Christmas's sectarian origin, the city
may inspire a least some observers to turn from the holiday's lay
atmosphere and contemplate its theological underpinning. 29 The
establishment clause's prohibition of governmental advancement of
religion forbids the city from thus aiding religion over secularism or
advancing a particular religion.
124 The district court discerned from the mayor's testimony that "the city has ac-
cepted and implemented the view ... that it is a 'good thing' to have a creche in a
Christmas display because it is a good thing to 'keep Christ in Christmas.'" Donnelly,
525 F. Supp. at 1173 (citations omitted).
125 Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1364. Congress declared Christmas a paid holiday for federal
workers in 1885 without debate. Contrary to the Lynch majority's assertion, Congress
neither referred to Christmas as "Christ's Mass" nor specified its reason for declaring
Christmas a federal holiday. See 15 CONG. REc. 166, 843, 2240 (1884); 16 CONG. REC.
411, 428, 430, 513 (1885); see also Donnelly, 691 F.2d at 1037 (Bownes, J., concurring)
(discussing congressional recognition of Christmas).
126 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
127 Id. at 431-42.
128 See supra note 125.
129 See Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1377 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The nativity scene is
clearly distinct in its purpose and effect from the rest of the ... display for the simple
reason that it is the only one rooted in a biblical account of Christ's birth.").
[Vol. 71:185200
RELIGIOUS DISPLAYS
B. Lynch's Implicit Approval of Other Nativity Displays
Pawtucket's creche was part of a Christmas display that in-
cluded many secular items.' 30 The Supreme Court viewed the
creche in the context of this display and the Christmas season' 3 1 and
did not explicitly state that a governmentally sponsored creche lack-
ing surrounding secular elements would pass constitutional muster.
In ACLU v. City of Birmingham, 132 the District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan distinguished Lynch on this basis. In City of Bir-
mingham the district court applied the Lemon test to a nativity scene,
standing alone, that the municipal government erected in front of
City Hall during the Christmas season. 133 The court found that the
city violated the Lemon test by displaying the creche and declared the
erection of the nativity scene unconstitutional.13 4 The trial judge
distinguished Lynch, arguing that "it does not, either on its face or in
any implicit proclamation, hold that a nativity scene standing alone
.. .complies with the requirements of the separation of church and
state required by our Constitution."'135
The Lynch dissent, writing that "[t]he Court's decision implicitly
leaves open questions concerning the constitutionality of the public
display .. .of a creche standing alone,"' 3 6 suggested the narrow
reading of Lynch that the City of Birmingham court adopted. Plaintiffs
seeking to enjoin nativity scenes surrounded by a few or no secular
items are likely to advocate this narrow reading in future cases.
Nevertheless, the language of the Lynch opinion does not indicate
that the majority intended to so limit its holding. The Lynch Court's
approval of Pawtucket's desire to celebrate "a particular historic
religious event. . . acknowledged in the Western World for 20 cen-
turies,"' 3 7 implies that a creche displayed alone and a creche sur-
rounded by secular items are equally acceptable. The Lynch opinion
refers to the secular items Pawtucket exhibited with the nativity
130 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
131 Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1362-65; see supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
132 588 F. Supp. 1337 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
'33 Id. at 1338-39. The city displayed the creche "[a]nnually . . . from approxi-
mately late November through early January of the following year." Id. at 1338.
134 Id. The trial judge found that the city did not have a secular purpose for spon-
soring the creche and that the creche impermissibly "advance[d], affirme[d], approve[d,
and otherwise validate[d] the Christian religion." Id. at 1339. The trial judge failed to
heed the Lynch Court's admonition against inquiring into political divisiveness unless the
case involves financial subsidies, see supra note 95 and accompanying text, and declared
that "the solely religious character of the display in question is such that it might cause
political divisiveness." 588 F. Supp. at 1339.
135 588 F. Supp. at 1339. See also Burrelle v. City of Nashua, 599 F. Supp. 792
(D.N.H. 1984) (ordering removal of creche from grounds of municipal offices and distin-
guishing Lynch because of lack of surrounding secular items).
136 104 S. Ct. at 1370 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
137 104 S. Ct. at 1365.
1985] 201
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
scene, but the Court did not rely on the presence of these items
when it held that the creche met the establishment clause's require-
ments. The majority's broad language approving Pawtucket's
creche as mere recognition of Christmas's religious origins applies
to a nativity scene that is not a part of a larger display. A creche
standing alone remains part of the same "Christmas season" back-
drop within which the Supreme Court viewed Pawtucket's cr~che' 38
and will thus have the same purpose, effect, and lack of entangle-
ment that the Court found in Lynch.
The district court's opinion in City of Birmingham is therefore in-
consistent with Lynch because it ignores the substance of the major-
ity's reasoning. The Lynch opinion did not create a "reindeer
rule" 13 9 exception to establishment clause doctrine whereby the
government can place secular Christmas decorations around a
cr~che and thereby make the display constitutional. The Lynch anal-
ysis extends beyond the particular facts in that case and permits the
government to display a cr~che during Christmas regardless of the
display's physical surroundings.
In contrast, the Second Circuit's decision in McCreaiy v. Stone, 14a
affirmed by a tied vote of the Supreme Court, correctly applied the
Lynch majority's reasoning. In McCreary, plaintiffs claimed that the
Village of Scarsdale, New York, violated their right of free expres-
sion by refusing them permission to erect a creche in a public
park.' 4 ' Issuing its decision prior to Lynch, the district court agreed
with the plaintiffs that the village's refusal was a content-based re-
striction on expression 142 but found that allowing the plaintiffs to
display a creche on public property would violate the establishment
clause by advancing religion. 143 The court concluded that the vil-
lage had a compelling interest for denying the plaintiffs' request and
held that the village's means were sufficiently narrow to conform to
first amendment doctrine. 144
On appeal, the Second Circuit relied on Lynch to reverse the
138 See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
139 Fin. Times, Dec. 24, 1985, at 4, col. 1 ("In a 5-4 decision, now often known as
the 'two plastic reindeer rule,' the court upheld the constitutionality of a city-sponsored
nativity scene on a private parkland as part of a larger secular Christmas display.").
140 739 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1984), aff'd mem. by an equally divided Court sub nom. Board of
Trustees v. McCreary, 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985).
141 McCreary v. Stone, 575 F. Supp. 1112, 1115 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). The district court
ruled against the plaintiffs' additional claim that the village violated their right to free
exercise of religion by not allowing them to use the park. Id. at 1121. The appellate
court reversed the trial court without reaching this issue. 739 F.2d at 722-30.
142 575 F. Supp. at 1125-26.
143 Id. at 1130-33.
144 Id. at 1133. The trial court did not explain its conclusion that Scarsdale's action
was narrowly tailored to the interest it served.
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trial court's finding that the cr&he would advance religion merely
by its presence on public property. 145 The court of appeals inter-
preted Lynch as holding that a nativity scene, regardless of "the
physical context within which the display of the creche [is] situated,"
does not impermissibly advance religion if displayed during the
Christmas season. 146 As a result, Scarsdale would not violate the
establishment clause by permitting the creche display.' 47 Because
the creche display would not implicate the establishment clause,
Scarsdale no longer had a compelling interest for its prohibition.
The court of appeals therefore enjoined the village from relying on
the establishment clause to support its decision. 148
C. Lynch's Mixed Effect on Displays of Other
Religious Symbols
The Supreme Court has yet to consider the constitutionality of
governmental displays of religious symbols other than nativity
scenes. Lower courts have decided both for and against govern-
ment defendants, but future cases will have to consider the effect of
the Lynch decision.
The display litigated in ACLU v. Rabun County149 fairly repre-
sents cases involving the constitutionality of displays of religious
symbols other than nativity scenes. In Rabun County the county's
Chamber of Commerce erected a large Latin cross on a mountain in
a state park and illuminated the cross for a few hours every night.150
The Georgia chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union sued to
have the cross dismantled, alleging that the presence of the religious
symbol on public property violated the establishment clause.' 5 '
The district court, applying the Lemon test,152 found that the state's
action had the purpose and effect of advancing Christianity and also
found excessive entanglement due to the cross's potential for creat-
ing political divisiveness.' 5 3 Accordingly, the trial court ruled this
145 McCreay, 739 F.2d at 724-29.
146 Id. at 729.
147 Id. at 730.
148 Id. The court of appeals emphasized that its decision affected only the village's
content-based restriction of the plaintiffs' right to expression and left open "the ability
of the village to establish reasonable time, place and manner restrictions regarding the
use of its public properties." Id.
149 698 F.2d 1098 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
150 The cross was 27 feet by 35 feet and was "illuminated approximately from sunset
until 10:15 or 10:30 p.m. each night." ACLU v. Rabun County, 510 F. Supp. 886, 888
(N.D. Ga. 1981).
151 Id.
152 Id. at 889.
153 Id. at 890-92. The trial court found that Chamber of Commerce statements indi-
cated "that the cross was placed on the mountain for religious reasons." Id. at 889. The
trial court also found that the "cross can have no other primary effect but to further the
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display unconstitutional.1 54
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court and ordered the
county to remove the cross. 155 The court of appeals applied the
Lemon test and concluded that "the Chamber ha[d] failed to estab-
lish a secular purpose" for displaying the cross. 156 The court based
its conclusion on Chamber of Commerce statements expressing the
important relationship between the cross and Easter' 57 and on the
cross's significance as a symbol of Christianity. 158 Because the
Chamber's action failed to meet the Lemon secular purpose require-
ment, the court declared the cross display unconstitutional without
considering the remaining prongs of the Lemon test. 159
Despite some factual similarity, Rabun County is distinguishable
from Lynch. Unlike the defendant city in Lynch, the Rabun County
Chamber of Commerce planned a year-round display of the reli-
gious symbol unconnected with the celebration of a national holi-
day. In Lynch the Court tried to minimize the religious significance
of the creche by stating that it merely depicted the origin of an offi-
cial national holiday, but this mitigating factor cannot defend the
constitutionality of a religious symbol displayed at other times of the
year. Even if the Chamber of Commerce erected the cross to cele-
brate the Easter holiday, Lynch offers little support because Easter is
not an official holiday.' 60 Thus, although defendants are likely to
cite Lynch as reflecting a broad approval of religious displays, the
decision only aids Christmas activities.
The Lynch reasoning can, however, validate some cross displays.
In Paul v. Dade County, 161 for example, a Florida appellate court
faced a claim that a cross displayed on a public building during
Christmas violated the federal Constitution. The plaintiff sued to
cause of the religion it symbolizes," id. at 891, and that this "apparent state sanction for
one religion over all others can cause tension and a concomitant risk of political diver-
gence on theological grounds." Id. at 892.
154 Id.
155 698 F.2d at 1111. The state did not participate in the appeal so the Chamber of
Commerce defended the cross's presence on state property. Id. at 1102 n.4. The Elev-
enth Circuit found that the cross's location on state property constituted state action. Id.
at 1109 n.19.
156 & . at 1111.
157 Id. The court cited "the selection of an Easter deadline for completion of the
cross, the decision to dedicate the cross at Easter Sunrise Services, and the several inspi-
rational statements contained in ... press releases" as evidence of a religious motive.
Id.
158 Id.atllO-11.
159 Id. at 1109-11. The remaining prongs of the Lemon test require that a challenged
activity neither advance nor inhibit religion nor excessively entangle religion and gov-
ernment. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
160 See 5 U.S.C. § 6103 (1982) (list of federal holidays does not include Easter).
161 202 So. 2d 833 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
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enjoin the Dade County Commission from erecting a "cross, made
by a string of lights ... [on] the coirthouse during the Christmas
season,"1 62 claiming that this display violated the establishment
clause. The court disagreed, finding that the commission intended
the cross and other "lights and decorations" to "attract holiday
shoppers to the downtown area."' 63 The court thus found that the
display had a secular purpose and also concluded that the cross did
not advance or inhibit religion. 164
The primary difference between Paul and Lynch lies in the two
symbols at issue: a cross, made of lights, and a creche. The Lynch
Court did not deny the religious nature of the creche,165 however,
and any attempt to distinguish the symbols on the basis of their re-
spective sectarian significance runs counter to the Court's policy of
avoiding ecclesiastical inquiries. 166 Indeed, both symbols could os-
tensibly serve the secular purpose of taking note of Christmas's reli-
gious origins. The Lynch opinion, taken to its logical conclusion,
thus extends beyond permitting nativity displays and validates the
public display of crosses at Christmas.
D. Lynch's Effect on the Lemon Test and the
Separationist Theory
The Lynch decision did not presage an immediate abandonment
by the Court of either the Lemon test or the constitutional barriers
separating church and state. 167 Nevertheless, the opinion reflects
the Supreme Court's growing shift to an accommodationist theory
162 Id. at 834.
163 Id. at 835.
164 Id. The court's brief opinion implied that the cross had become a secular symbol
and therefore did not advance religion.
165 Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1365 n.12.
166 See Watson v.Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 733 (1871) ("[I]t is easy to see that if
the civil courts are to inquire into all these [ecclesiastical] matters, the whole subject of
the doctrinal theology, the usages and customs . . . of every religious denomination
may, and must, be examined into with minuteness and care .. ").
167 The Court handed down four opinions during the 1984 term involving establish-
ment clause questions. In each of these cases the Court invalidated the allegedly uncon-
stitutional activity. These decisions reflect the turmoil the present Court faces when
deciding religion cases, however, rather than a rejection of the accomodationism present
in Lynch. See Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985) (invalidating New York City's
practice of funding public school teachers who entered parochial schools to provide re-
medial instruction); Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985) (disallow-
ing school district's practice of providing supplementary courses and after school
courses in private schools); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2914 (1985)
(striking down Connecticut statute that required employers to excuse employee from
work if employee wished to observe his Sabbath); Wallace v. Jaifree, 105 S. Ct. 2479
(1985) (striking down Alabama statute that provided students with moment of silence to
pray or meditate on ground that only religious concerns motivated legislature to pass
law).
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of establishment clause interpretation.1 6  The majority's refusal to
be bound by the Lemon test, 169 for example, implicitly criticizes the
strict separation doctrine. The Lemon test's prohibition against ad-
vancing religion 70 represents a separationist interpretation of the
establishment clause because it forbids governmental aid to religion
even if provided in a nondiscriminatory manner. The weakness of
the Lynch majority's arguments that Pawtucket's cr&che did not ad-
vance religion' 7' reveals the Court's difficulty when it relies on the
Lemon test to reach an accommodationist result. Similarly, the
Court's statement that "[iln each [establishment clause] case, the in-
quiry calls for line drawing; no fixed, per se rule can be framed"'172
demonstrates the court's desire to avoid the rigid separation of
church and state present in the Lemon test.
Justice O'Connor's concurrence 73 openly adopted an accom-
modationist posture. O'Connor suggested that a governmental
practice advancing religion will not violate the first amendment un-
less the government intends or is perceived to endorse religion, or
the practice creates administrative entanglement.' 74 O'Connor's re-
liance on intent, however, would effectively permit governmental
entities to engage in religious activities that the Lemon test would
prohibit. The Court's frequent difficulty in determining the motive
of state actors' 75 and its deference to avowed secular objectives' 76
place a heavy burden on a plaintiff who must prove the govern-
168 The Court decisions in Lynch and Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), dis-
cussed supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text, reflect the Court's willingness to re-
treat from a separationist interpretation of the first amendment when faced with fact
patterns dissimilar from those in earlier cases.
169 104 S. Ct. at 1362. Lynch was not the first time the Court expressed its refusal to
be tied to the Lemon test. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 359 (1975) (plurality)
("[T]he tests must not be viewed as setting the precise limits to the necessary constitu-
tional inquiry, but serve only as guidelines with which to identify instances in which the
objectives of the Establishment Clause have been impaired .. "). Since the develop-
ment of the Lemon test, however, the Court has applied it in all but two cases. See supra
notes 46-57 and accompanying text. See also Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1371 n.2 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
170 See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
171 See supra notes 111-29 and accompanying text.
172 Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1361 (emphasis in original).
173 Id. at 1366-70 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See supra notes 96-99 and accompany-
ing text.
174 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
175 See, e.g., Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1372 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting lack of "ex-
plicit statement of purpose by Pawtucket's municipal government accompanying its deci-
sion to purchase, display and maintain the cr~che.").
176 In Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1983), the Court observed that a chal-
lenged governmental activity usually passes the Lemon test's secular purpose require-
ment, and explained that "[t]his reflects, at least in part, our reluctance to attribute
unconstitutional motives to the States, particularly when a plausible secular purpose for
the State's program may be discerned from the face of the statute." Id.
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ment's improper motive. Furthermore, Lynch's requirement that the
government "accommodate" religion 177 expands the number of
governmental motives that can withstand constitutional attack.
Thus, O'Connor's emphasis on intent as a test of constitutionality
would allow government officials to defend establishment clause
suits with much greater success than would the Lemon formula.
Moreover, the majority's decision to scrutinize Pawtucket's
crche within the larger context of the Christmas season 178 also
weakens the Lemon test's prohibition against advancement of reli-
gion. In Lynch the majority expanded the focus of its inquiry from
the cr~che alone to include Pawtucket's entire display and the his-
tory of official recognition of Christmas as a public holiday. 179 By
expanding the context in which the Court views a challenged activ-
ity, the majority has made it easier to find that the surroundings
minimize the importance of any particular religious component.
This reasoning enables courts to find that a state act advancing reli-
gion could generate an overall effect too insignificant to merit con-
stitutional 'concern. The danger of this approach is that
accommodationist courts could approve even the most blatantly sec-
tarian practice by viewing it as merely an insignificant portion of a
large, secular whole and thereby erode the Constitution's prohibi-
tion against governmental establishment of any or all religions.
The majority's approval of Pawtucket's claim that acknowledg-
ing the religious origins of Christmas constituted a valid govern-
mental objective'8 also indicates their desire to accommodate
religious displays. Court precedent Would have allowed the major-
ity to find a secular purpose for the challenged display without
reaching this issue. Although the city argued at trial that its creche
and entire Christmas display purported to draw shoppers to the
downtown area, 181 the district court found that the evidence failed
to support this claim. The Lynch majority could have relied on the
Court's policy of deference to government motives' 8 2 to find that in
this specific instance the claimed economic objective was a "plausi-
ble secular purpose."' 183 Instead, however, the Court went one step
further by providing an exposition on the general acceptability of
governmental acknowledgment of a religious event. The Court's
adoption of this line of reasoning demonstrates its unsettled views
toward the relationship between government and religion. These
177 Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1359.
178 See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
179 See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
180 See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
181 Donnelly, 525 F. Supp. at 1170.
182 See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
183 Mueller, 463 U.S. at 394.
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unsettled views, and the Lynch precedent, could provide support for
a future complete reevalution of the Lemon test.
CONCLUSION
Lynch v. Donnelly demonstrates the Supreme Court's question-
ing of the separationist theory implicit in the Lemon test and earlier
Court decisions. The Court's arguments that Pawtucket's creche
meets the Lemon test's requirements fail because the Lynch majority
could not show that the creche does not advance religion. The ma-
jority's willingness to approve the creche even though it violated the
spirit of the Lemon test demonstrates that, at least in some situations,
the Court will tolerate government support of religion. Justice
O'Connor's concurrence shows a greater accommodationist reading
of the establishment clause because her proposed modification of
the Lemon test allows governmental advancement of religion and
places a heavy burden of proof on plaintiffs seeking to halt govern-
mental support for religious activities.
The Lynch opinion has the immediate effect of permitting gov-
ernmental sponsorship of Christmas displays that include nativity
scenes. The Court's arguments, however, extend further than
Lynch's facts and allow governmental entities to erect a creche or
other religious symbol during the Christmas season. Although local
governments must still tread gingerly when deciding what symbols
to erect, lest they run afoul of the establishment clause's command
against discriminating amongst sects, the Lynch decision gives con-
stitutional backing to governmental support for the religious aspects
of public holidays.
Glenn S. Gordon
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